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及“企业的 VC 背景”这四组自变量与高管团队水平薪酬差距之间的相关关系。 






















I I  
 
Abstract 
Issues on compensation have long been regarded as one of the most important domain 
of Management, in which many scholars have devoted to the design and strategy of 
compensation, the influential factors of floating compensation, and the connection 
between compensation and performance etc. However this article only focuses on the 
compensation gap among TMG①. Referring to previous related researches, almost all 
the articles are written about the compensation gap between CEO level and non-CEO 
level, or TMG and general workers, or the relation between compensation gap and 
performance etc. Specifically this article chooses to focus on the horizontal gap of 
TMG compensation to discuss the correlation of TMG founder percentage, the 
administrative power of CEO, TMG shareholding ratio and whether it is VC backed, 
towards corresponding horizontal gap of TMG compensation. 
This article does empirical analysis with samples consisting of companies from 
Shenzhen SMEs board and growth enterprise market board, and data collected from 
CSMAR database and manually. Via descriptive analysis, we found that the Board 
level holds the highest mean value and standard deviation of horizontal compensation 
gap. Then this article does multiple regression analysis with 4 groups of independent 
variables towards 4 corresponding dependent variables. The result indicates that TMG 
founder percentage has negative relation with gap in group 1-3; the administrative 
power of CEO has positive relation with gap in group 3, and the administrative power 
of founder CEO has positive one with gap in group 2; TMG shareholdings has a 
negative relation with gaps in all 4 groups; VC-topten has no relation with gaps but 
VC-board has positive relation with gaps in all 4 groupss.    
Key words: Horizontal compensation gap; Founder Ratio; shareholding ratio; VC.  
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证是对组织不利的，例如 Siegel & Hambrick（2005）[3]发现，技术越密集的企业，








1.2 相关概念的界定  




























































































































































 第 1 章 绪论。本章主要阐述本文的研究背景、研究意义、概念界定、研究
方法、内容框架、研究设计以及文章创新性。 
 第 2 章 理论基础及文献综述。本章首先对管家理论、委托代理理论、管理
者权力理论、薪酬差距理论等理论内容及意义进行系统梳理，进而对于高管薪酬
差距及其影响因素、创始人薪酬等相关问题的国内外文献进行整理。 
 第 3 章 研究假设。本章通过理论推导，提出四大假设，探讨“创始高管的
人数比例”、“二职合一”、“高管持股比例”，以及“企业的 VC 背景”四组自变
量对于高管水平（Horizontal）薪酬差距的影响。 
 第 4 章 数据及研究模型。本章主要阐述样本数据的来源，以及研究变量的
定义，以及模型的设计。 
 第 5 章 实证检验及结果。本章首先对于各变量进行描述性的统计分析，接
着对各变量之间进行相关系分析，继而探讨研究模型的多重共线性问题，删除膨
胀因子过高的变量，最后开展多元线性回归分析，验证四大假设。 


























 第二，在创业及 IPO 前，企业往往会引入一些机构投资者，这些投资者持股
比例往往较大，可能会通过派驻非执行董事或监视等方式来参与企业的管理，帮
助企业制定战略和决策等。本文不仅讨论了“企业的 VC 背景”对高管团队水平
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